



## **National Commission on the Future of the Army**

2530 Crystal Drive, Zachary Taylor Building, Suite 5000  
Arlington, VA 22202

**SUBJECT:** National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) Minutes – LTG Tim Kadavy meeting with Chairman Ham

**Date:** 22 September 2015

**Time:** 1530 – 1640 EST

**Location:** Pentagon 3E406, Arlington, VA

**Format:** round table discussion

**Attendees:**

GEN (R) Carter Ham, NCFA Chairman  
LTG Tim Kadavy, Director, Army National Guard  
MG (R) Raymond Carpenter, NCFA Executive Director  
Mr. Don Tison, Designated Federal Officer (DFO)  
Mr. Rickey Smith, NCFA Staff Director  
COL Mark Strong, Chief of Staff, Army National Guard (ARNG)  
LTC Barry Vincent, NCFA Staff  
MAJ Cory Simpson, Legal Advisor to DFO

**Documents Submitted to Commission:**

Vision 2020: Army National Guard Strategic Vision

**Meeting Summary**

The meeting started at 1530 hours with the DFO explaining how provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) applied to NCFA activities. Commissioner Ham then asked LTG Kadavy a series of questions.

How could Title 10 USC § 12304b authority and funding be expanded to better support Combatant Commands (COCOMs)? The Army could add 2,000-3,000 man/years to support EUCOM, AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM as a means of making relatively small numbers of assigned forces look much larger. Using ARNG units for Overseas Deployment Training missions would continue to keep the mobilization process well understood. We also need to continue to refine the training tasks for a given theater of operations to allow the greatest amount of time conducting mission after mobilization and, thereby lengthening the amount of time in theater.

What is the shelf life of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) when it has progressed through the training cycle and completed all training? The ARNG BCTs do not experience the same amount of personnel turbulence as an active BCT, which extends their readiness.

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The readiness could be extended further by conducting training events and exercises that allow the ARNG BCTs to maintain that edge to prevent atrophy.

The ARNG is ideally suited to perform planned, predictable missions like KFOR,<sup>1</sup> MFO,<sup>2</sup> and even Europe, Kuwait, and Korea. The restricted use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) dollars and under-funded 12304b prohibits ARNG units from doing those missions. Not specifying Atlantic Resolve as a DOD “named operation” continues to cause similar problems.

Adding funding into the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) account provides means to send Reserve Component (RC) forces otherwise not available. The travel costs are in COCOM budgets. Operations and Maintenance funds are not the problem. The shortfall is in Pay and Allowances for RC Soldiers that restricts the use of the ARNG.

When you send an ARNG unit overseas for training or for a predictable mission, you still practice pre-mobilization activities. This keeps the Army training and mobilization pipeline working.

Should the ARNG BCTs be in the rotation for operational deployments for the big missions, like Korea, Europe, and Kuwait? Yes, but we cannot just throw them in. They have to be resourced to do those missions.

100 percent of the Army Guard Soldiers want to be used on missions. Their families and employers would support them serving predictable missions. If we can project missions two to three years out, then, we can focus resources and training to absolutely accomplish any mission.

While Active Army Divisions<sup>3</sup> are exceeding rotational goals, why are the ARNG Divisions are not being used? There seems to be a hesitation to using the ARNG Divisions. We need to identify what experiences, education, or training opportunities we are giving our AC Division command teams that we are not giving our RC leaders. There has been talk about developing augmentation cells that could support the Army Service Component Commands with an Operations or Intelligence element. Doing that would develop leaders and gain trust at senior levels as leaders from every component interact and share experiences.

Cross component assignments for officers at the rank of Brigadier General and Major General would aid in building relationships. Maybe we require ARNG Brigadier Generals to complete a year or more assignment with an AC Division or Corps prior to

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<sup>1</sup> NATO has been leading a peace-support operation in Kosovo – the Kosovo Force (KFOR) - since June 1999.

<sup>2</sup> The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) is an international peacekeeping force overseeing the terms of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The MFO generally operates in and around the Sinai Peninsula.

<sup>3</sup> Army Divisions converted to only headquarters under the modular reorganization initiative. Army Divisions no longer have organic brigades.

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selection for commanding an ARNG Division. Faces should be familiar to active Army senior leaders. Maybe, we need to do more exchanges with Combatant Commands?

We need to gain clarity on what ARNG seeks concerning TTHS.<sup>4</sup> What is the ARNG Director's position? The Adjutants General (TAGs) agree with a TTHS-like account, but not at the expense of force structure. ARNG does not need every unit to have an overage for their trainees, but rather we need to manage the trainees for certain units in TR2 or TR3<sup>5</sup> to have those units filled with personnel available to conduct collective training in preparation for their available year. The appropriate number is somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 total ARNG spaces focused on the right units, right Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs), and at right time. Assume risk in separate companies where there is little collective training required and there is no staff. Do not assume risk is in the BCTs. Use the over-strength spaces in the BCTs where the higher level of collective training tasks reside, and build unit cohesion required for a larger combat arms mission. Smaller organizations could still employ cross-leveling to get them ready. After that, focus on those organizations that require a long lead time for technical training: Aviation, Special Forces, Signal, Cyber, and Intelligence.

A good example is the way readiness was built for the 45th Infantry BCT in 2010 while preparing for the 2011 deployment to Afghanistan. NGB authorized the Oklahoma ARNG to over recruit to 115 percent strength early in the cycle and the result was a deployable BCT that did not require cross-leveling from other units.

How long does it take to get the unit back down to 100 percent strength? Natural attrition occurs at a rate of 17 percent per year on average, so within one year after a deployment the unit is back down to authorized strength.

What are you hearing on AH-64 Apache issue? There is still concern for the outcome of the Commission report and Congress' decision. The ARNG alternative to Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) inactivates the two battalions in Missouri and Pennsylvania, but they each retain an attack company that would align with units in South Carolina and Arizona. Each of the States that currently have Apaches would retain some capability in the state under the ARNG alternative. The big hole that we are working through is the loss of the OH-58 battalion in Tennessee that requires ARNG to move aircraft among states. We have provided the plan to fully implement ARI if that is what Congress decides. That plan is in no way to be construed as the Adjutants General desire to implement that plan. 48 AH-64 aircraft are being transferred now, but no more will go until 60 days after the NCFA report is submitted to allow Congress time to react to the report.

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<sup>4</sup> TTHS, Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) account used for Regular Army manpower when a Soldier is not assigned to a position in an operational unit or institutional organization.

<sup>5</sup> Army units routinely report readiness for manning, equipping, and training. Training is reported at various levels labeled T1, T2, etc., based on a unit's ability to conduct collective tasks.

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If the President's Budget is approved and ARI becomes the law of the land, what does that mean in terms of trying to mend the rift between the Army components? Ultimately, everyone will move on, but it will take much longer to repair. There are some that are very invested in Apache issue and will have a hard time moving on. TAGs of the states with Apache aircraft are very much invested. Other TAGs view ARI as an attack on ARNG role as the combat reserve of the Army.

Commissioner Ham then shared information gained during NCFA site visits.

- ARNG Lieutenants and Captains in Nashville voiced some really strong opinions about the post-mobilization process. Their bad experiences were from 2013-2015 deployments. The efforts underway by the First Army leadership to improve post-mobilization process have just not filtered down to that level yet.
- Another mobilization issue causing problems again is the training set equipment removed from Fort Bliss. As Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) is reduced for OCONUS operations, we have the same problem as before, where a unit has to take equipment to the MOB station to train on, and also has to ship their equipment into theater.

Did NGB have an opportunity to review and/or concur with papers submitted by TAGs to NCFA? NGB knew about the papers, but did not "chop" on the papers before submission. Many times TAGs will ask for data and sometimes for our opinion, which we provide, but they develop their own papers. They are entitled to their opinions.

Some of the bigger States (e.g. Florida, California, and Texas) are voicing concerns about demographic shifts (increase in population to support) causing them to ask for more force structure and end strength authorization. How does this work? In today's world, giving force structure to one State requires taking force structure from other States. The smaller States believe they cannot give any more force structure while retaining the ability to respond when their Governor asks for military assistance. The larger States are saying the size of their Guard is not big enough to support the population they have. The balancing of risk and capacity will continue.

Why do homeland security requirements count for so little in the force-sizing construct? There are legitimate threats to the United States that the Department of Defense needs to be prepared to address. We ought to know what the full requirement is even if the full requirement is not affordable so you know where the gaps are, and the risk.

The meeting adjourned at 1640 hours.